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Approximately ninety percent of all serious offenses reported in the
United States involve property theft.' Crimes against property were
estimated to occur every three seconds in 19782 and to cost American
consumers as much as $20.3 billion annually.3 Despite the damaging
effect of such crimes on the community, fewer than twenty percent of
the known incidents are cleared by arrest.4
There have been two major law enforcement responses to the
problem of property theft. The traditional approach is aimed at arrest
and prosecution of the thief. Recently, this approach has been supple-
mented by increased concentration on the thief's immediate market
for his products, the fence.5 Even the combination of these two ap-
proaches, however, has had little noticeable effect on the incidence of
property theft. This failure is attributable to a number of factors, the
most obvious of which is the difficulty of apprehending and prosecuting
thieves and fences. Conviction of thieves is difficult, in part because a
I. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1978, at 35 (1979) (crimes reported in 1978) [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM CRIME REPORTs-1978]. These statistics, compiled by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The term "property crime" includes burglary,
larceny, and motor vehicle theft, but does not include robbery (taking through force or
threat of force). Because statistics obviously cannot include crimes that are never re-
ported, the property theft problem may be far greater than statistics show. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTics-1977, at 303, Table 3.2 (1977) (more
than 50% of thefts may never be reported to police).
2. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1978, supra note 1, at 6.
3. See Blakey & Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribution of Stolen Property: Tile Need for
Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1517-18 (1976).
4. The ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system's response to crimes against prop-
erty was emphasized in a study conducted more than a decade ago. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOClETY 4 (1967) (prevalence of burglary and robbery a significant reason for nation's alarm
about crime, and protecting community from those two crimes would do much to make
crime as a whole less frightening). In 1978, however, police cleared only 18.1% of such
crimes. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1978, supra note I, at 177, Table 20. The 1967 clearance
rate was approximately 19.3%. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1967, at 109, Table 16 (1968) (based
on 1977 definitions of property crimes but fewer cities included in 1967 calculation).
5. The term "fence" is the colloquial expression for the criminal receiver of stolen
goods. M. WALSH, THE FENCE 4 (1977). More accurately, a fence is a commercial criminal
receiver of stolen goods who intends to profit by reselling the merchandise. This com-
mercial aspect distinguishes the fence from the "lay" criminal receiver who buys for
personal consumption. Commercial receivers have been termed either "occasional" or
"professional," according to the amount of their criminal activity. See J. HALL, THEFT,
LAW AND SOCIETY 155 n.l (2d ed. 1952).
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thief can quickly dispose of the evidence of his crime by selling the
stolen property to a fence.6 Conviction of fences is also difficult; the
criminal receiver of stolen goods is notorious for his insulation from
the justice system.7 There is an additional problem, however, that
relates to enforcement policy:" efforts directed only at thieves and
fences who buy from thieves may ignore the parties who potentially
provide the ultimate economic motivation for property theft, the
secondary purchasers. These purchasers, who buy stolen goods from
fences, can be the key element in the incentive structure that supports
property crime. When such individuals are present in the redistribu-
tion channel, law enforcement strategies that neglect them overlook a
significant source of the economic motivation behind property theft.
This Note argues that increased attention should be given to detect-
ing and prosecuting the criminal customers of a fence. Because second-
ary purchasers are integral components of the social and economic
conditions motivating thefts, deterrence of such offenders could sub-
stantially reduce the profits of the primary fence and thieves and
thereby reduce the incidence of property crimes as well. Furthermore,
criminal secondary purchasers may be both easier to detect and easier
to deter than the other criminal participants in the redistribution
channel for stolen goods.
I. The Channel of Stolen Property Redistribution
Thieves rarely steal for personal consumption.9 They steal for profit
and so rely on the existence of an immediate market for stolen prop-
6. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1514.
7. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 195 ("Indeed, the history of receiving stolen property
might be written in terms of the difficulties of convicting these offenders."). For a de-
tailed account of the historical development and inadequacies of criminal sanctions ap-
plied to the receivers of stolen goods, see Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1542-1601.
8. Problems associated with enforcement policies are difficult to discern from statistics
because available statistics on criminal receivers are misleading. See Criminal Redistribu.
tion Systems and their Economic Impact on Small Business: Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1973) (statement of Joseph
P. Busch, District Attorney, County of Los Angeles) (statistics misleading because many
burglars plead or are convicted of criminal receiving) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
However, recent books and articles designed to shift enforcement attention from the
thief to the primary fence, see, e.g., LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING THE CRIMINAL RECEIVER OF STOLEN GOODS
(1976) [hereinafter cited as STRATEGIES]; Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, give a fairly
accurate representation of current enforcement policy. Interview with Dr. Marilyn Walsh,
Research Scientist, Batelle Law & Justice Study Center, in Seattle, Washington (June 25,
1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Walsh Interview].
9. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1514; cf. Hearings, supra note 8, at 3 (State-
ment of Joseph P. Busch, District Attorney, County of Los Angeles) ("[B]urglars depend
totally on fences for their existence.").
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erty.10 This market consists of both "commercial" receivers, who resell
the merchandise, and "lay" receivers, who consume the goods.,11 Vertical
redistribution from thief to consumer may involve a series of levels. 12
At the primary level, the thief transfers property to a first purchaser,
usually a commercial receiver.' 3 Commentators have identified a spec-
trum of these offenders with varying degrees of criminal involvement
and influence;' 4 while some may deal only occasionally in stolen
property, others may maintain sophisticated organizations for this pur-
pose and may even supply thieves with advance orders for illicit
merchandise. 15
At the secondary and any subsequent levels, the intermediary receiver
transfers the property to a purchaser who may be either commercial or
lay.' These secondary purchasers have in common that they are all
customers of commercial receivers. Like legitimate merchandise in a
legitimate market, a stolen article may pass through several business
establishments before reaching an ultimate consumer.
Even though the redistribution channel may involve many par-
ticipants, only those who are aware that the merchandise is stolen are
guilty of criminal conduct.' 7 The number of aware participants in a
10. Hearings, supra note 8, at 159 (letter from Robert Earl Barnes) (thieves steal what
can be sold and better thieves sell before they steal).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. See Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory and the Fencing of Stolen Goods, 50
DEN. L.J. 177, 191-92 (1973) (discussing factors affecting length of channels of distribution).
13. See id. at 184.
14. See, e.g., STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 10 (list of fencing roles from most passive to
most active); Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1529-42 (types of fencing activity in-
clude the neighborhood connection, the outlet fence, the professional fence, the fhaster
fence, and organized crime).
15. STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 9-10; Hearings, supra note 8, at 30-36 (testimony of
Miss A. Jones); Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1536.
16. Both commercial and lay criminal secondary purchasers have been acknowledged
to be part of the property theft problem. The secondary fence may be a "neighborhood"
fence working with a professional receiver who specializes in wholesaling. Blakey &
Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1530 n.111. He may be an "outlet" fence, such as an em-
ployee in a large retail establishment who buys stolen goods disguised as legitimate from
professional or master fences. Id. at 1531. The arrangements for such sales may even be
made before the theft is engineered. Id. at 1536. Other secondary fences may buy stolen
goods from organized crime syndicates operating as primary receivers and "funneling
stolen goods through interstate commerce ... " Id. at 1541.
The lay criminal receiver, or consumer, is also a problem in some redistribution net-
works. Id. at 1520 ("[T]he survival of criminal redistribution systems depends upon the
continued propensity of consumers and businesses to buy illegal goods.") (footnote
omitted); Roselius & Benton, supra note 12, at 202 (discussion of potential benefits
derived from reduction of market demand for stolen goods); Chasan, Good Fences Make
Bad Neighbors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 17 (low prices of stolen
goods naturally attract consumers).
17. Mens rea, or "guilty mind," is an element of the statutory offense of receiving
stolen goods. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(1) (West 1970) (knowing); CoNN. GEN.
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particular channel depends on a variety of factors but is largely de-
termined by characteristics of the property transferred,", such as the
condition of the property at the time of theft, 19 its resale value, storage
requirements, and salability by a particular receiver.20
II. The Need for Additional Enforcement Strategies
Of the various criminal participants in redistribution channels, the
thief traditionally has attracted the preponderance of law enforcement
attention.21 Although the relationship between theft and the criminal
receiver of stolen goods has been acknowledged since the early eight-
eenth century, -2 2 only recently have enforcement resources been di-
rected against this offender.23
STAT. ANN. § 53a-119(8) (West Supp. 1979) (knowing or believing); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 16-1(d) (Smith-Hurd 1977) (same). When a statute requires the receiver to know that the
goods have been stolen, it has been held that a jury need only find that the receiver could
infer the theft from the circumstances of the sale. United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438,
441-42 (2d Cir. 1947).
Secondary purchasers with guilty knowledge may or may not be present in particular
redistribution channels. Some authorities have indicated that aware secondary purchasers
are part of the local redistribution system. Telephone Interview with Detective Kirkendall,
Miami, Florida Fencing Squad (Aug. 28, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal);
Telephone Interview with Sgt. McFarland, St. Louis County Dep't of Police, St. Louis,
Missouri (August 29, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). Others believed that in
most cases the thief and the primary fence were the only criminal participants in stolen
goods redistribution channels. Telephone Interview with Larry McNeely, Fencing Anal)st,
California Dep't of Justice, Sacramento, California (August 28, 1979) (notes on file with
Yale Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Sgt. Harry Boggs, Portland, Oregon, Police
Dep't Fencing Detail (July 3, 1979 and Sept. 11, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Boggs Interview].
18. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Taking the
Offensive 9 (Nov. 22, 1978) ("The nature and extent of the [stolen property distribution]
system is primarily determined by the property itself.") [hereinafter cited as Taking the
Offensive]. Differences between consumers also may affect the length of the redistribu-
tion channel. According to one analysis, if the consumer is aware that the merchandise
is stolen, the thief may sell the goods directly or use a fence as a type of broker. If a
consumer is unaware, or if the intended customer is an industrial concern, the stolen
character of the merchandise must be disguised and one or more fences may be required.
Roselius & Benton, supra note 12, at 191-92.
19. For example, when new, crated shipments are stolen from airports and seaports, the
thief may be able to sell the merchandise directly to a large retail outlet. The stolen
merchandise can be intermingled with legitimate items and then sold at full market
price to an unsuspecting customer. At the other extreme, the marketing of easily identi-
fiable secondhand merchandise obtained from residential and commercial thefts may
require a willing and aware consumer or the involvement of intermediary receivers who
disguise or transport the stolen goods. See Roselius & Benton, supra note 12, at 191-92.
20. See Taking the Offensive, supra note 18, at 9.
21. STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 3; Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1514.
22. The prosecution of Jonathan Wild evidences this early awareness. Wild, called the
Father of Professional Fencing, was brought to trial in London in 1725. C. KLOCKARS, THE
PROFESSIONAL FENCE 3-27 (1974). Several of the offenses with which he was charged related
to the assistance he provided to thieves. 2 G. BoRRow, CELEBRATED TRIALS 502-04 (1928).
23. See STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 3.
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A. Enforcement Against Thieves
The thief's predominant position in enforcement policy is natural
because the act of stealing generally leaves behind both a potential
complainant and an immediate sense of danger in the community. 24
However, as the high incidence and low conviction rates for reported
thefts suggest,2 this focus on the thief has proven ineffective.
Various weaknesses have been recognized in the conventional ap-
proach.20 First, the individual crimes are difficult to solve. Because
police investigations begin only some time after a theft occurs, time gen-
erally favors the criminal.27 Solution is arduous and costly-victims must
be interviewed and willing witnesses sought; the crime scence must be
examined to collect physical evidence.28 Second, this approach to prop-
erty crime ignores the thief's market for stolen goods, and in so doing
fails to lessen the economic motivation for theft.29 Because police
traditionally respond to victim complaints, when the thief is appre-
hended, the crime often is considered solved.30 But apprehension of
24. Traditional theft enforcement policy is reactive; police respond to complaints.
Taking the Offensive, supra note 18, at 8. Although most criminal acts are reported to
police by their victims, an easily discerned criminal act may be reported by anyone who
happens upon the scene of the crime. P. WESTON & K. WELLS, THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 36 (3d ed. 1977). Fencing activity is covert and only indirectly harms the theft
victim, who is unlikely to be aware of it. Only the criminal distributors themselves are
apt to have knowledge of the illicit activity. Thus fencing is unlikely to be the subject of
a complaint by either the victim or others. Police may become aware of fencing activity
only through statistical indicators, such as high theft rates coupled with low clearance
rates and low property recovery rates, information received from theft offenders, and
because of the incidence of collateral crimes, such as tax fraud or failure to comply with
business licensing regulations. STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 22-26.
25. See note 3 supra.
26. M. WALSH, suPra note 5, at 172-74 (weaknesses include post-hoc quality of enforce-
ment efforts, assumption that catching thief solves the crime, and failure to focus on
redistribution system).
27. Id.; P. WESTON & K. WELLS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 242 (1970).
28. P. WESTON & K. WELLS, supra note 27, at 241; cf. Walsh, Reassessing Your Agency's
Property Crimes Enforcement Mission 4 (March 1979) (Introduction on file with Yale
Law Journal) (because of thieves' declining skills and less distinctive modus operandi in
last 20 years, criminal justice system's ability to identify thieves from evidence at crime
scene has declined).
The authors of a 1971 study of New York City felonies noted with respect to burglaries:
The lower clearance and arrest rates might be explained by a lack of face-to-face
contact in most burglaries. In assault, attempted murder, rape and robbery, the victim
has at least seen the perpetrator once. But the "real," professional burglar will make
his getaway before the crime is discovered, and the police acknowledge that the
chances of finding and linking him with the crime are slim. Thus, the courts are
likely to be processing a minority of burglars unlucky or incompetent enough to
be caught, or who are already kilown to their victims.
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW
YORK CrrY's COURTS 81-82 (1977).
29. Md. WALSH, suPra note 5, at 172-74.
30. Id. at 173.
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the individual thief leaves his market untouched; demand persists
and new thieves may step in to replace him if the arrest removes him
from the redistribution channel. Thus, the overall level of property
theft may not be appreciably altered.
In response to these problems, property theft enforcement strategies
and policies are changing. Tactics are being utilized that attract un-
known offenders to undercover officers posing as primary fences.3 I Al-
though this storefront, or "sting," operation has been criticized, 2 some
recent improvements in property theft statistics may be attributable to
its use. 3 Additionally, police are becoming more concerned with the
market for stolen goods. When a thief is apprehended, enforcement
authorities increasingly attempt to elicit information about his fence.34
B. Enforcement Against Primary Fences
The ineffectiveness of concentrating enforcement efforts exclusively
on thieves has led to increased efforts to apprehend their fences. In
many ways, however, the fence presents an even more difficult enforce-
ment challenge. Detection of the very commission of the crime is
problematic. Unlike a theft, the crime committed by a fence leaves no
likely complainants-anyone who knows of the fence's criminal activity
31. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has put major emphasis on so-
called "sting" operations. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Some Benefits Realized from Twelve Sting-Type Anti-Fencing Operations 1-2
(June 30, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Benefits Realized]. Since 1974, more than 60 "sting"
projects have been conducted in 39 jurisdictions. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEPT OF JusTicE, WHAT HAPPENED 1-1 (1979). A recent newsletter suggests that
the number of such projects continues to grow. Antifencing Program Recovers S200
Million in 5 Years, 8 LEAA NEWSLETTER 6 (November 1979) (85 "sting" projects concluded
in 46 cities) [hereinafter cited as Antifencing Program].
In the storefront "sting" tactic, police pose as primary fences for the purpose of
penetrating the stolen property redistribution system. Transactions are videotaped and,
after sufficient evidence is collected, the thieves and competing primary fences are ar-
rested. Taking the Offensive, supra note 18, at I.
32. Some criticisms focus on the characterization of this technique as an antifencing
strategy. See, e.g., Benefits Realized, supra note 31; Taking the Offensive, supra note 18.
In reality, fewer than one in five of the subjects apprehended and/or identified in
"stings" have been classified as fences. Anti-Fencing Program, supra note 31, at 6. Be-
cause the great majority of arrestees are thieves, commentators reject the storefront as an
antifencing tactic. STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 95-96. Other criticisms focus on the rationale
behind strategies that target the unknown offender. Because the procedure attracts un-
identified thieves who want to sell stolen goods, the "sting" is considered by some to be
a procedure whereby tax money is used to buy back stolen property that the thieves may
have been encouraged to steal because of the available market provided by the police. Id.
33. See Benefits Realized, supra note 31, at 3-10 to 3-13.
34. Information about fences may have been collected previously to get fences to co-
operate as informants against particularly notorious thieves who aroused public resent-
ment. STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 4-5; Chappell & alsh, Receiving Stolen Property: The
Need for Systematic Inquiry into the Fencing Process, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 484, 490 (1974).
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is probably also criminal, and is helped, not harmed, by the crime.
Therefore, the antifencing strategies that have been developed rely
primarily on thieves for information about illegal fencing activity.35
Once information concerning specific offenders has been collected in
this manner, enforcement efforts typically employ surveillance and,
often, undercover agents posing as thieves or purchasers in order to
obtain sufficient evidence for conviction .3
Reliance on thieves as sources of information creates other problems,
however. In order to obtain conviction of a fence, enforcement authori-
ties must be prepared to compromise cases against thieves and perhaps
to grant immunity in order to secure their cooperation.. 7 Although the
fence, arguably, deserves higher priority than thieves in property theft
enforcement,38 reluctance to make this trade-off persists39 and anti-
fencing strategies remain a small part of the criminal law enforcement
effort.40
In addition, thieves deal only with the primary receiver in the re-
distribution channel, by definition. Thus, identification of specific
secondary criminal receivers must proceed by other means. Virtually
no known strategies are currently employed for this purpose.41
III. Toward a New Strategy: Allocating Enforcement Resources to
Criminal Secondary Purchasers
Current enforcement strategies would be enhanced by increased ef-
forts to detect and prosecute criminal secondary purchasers of stolen
goods. Because such purchasers may be both easier to detect and easier
to deter than are either primary fences or thieves, the utility of shifting
a small portion of property theft enforcement resources to such efforts
35. See STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 74 (antifencing strategies have in common use of
the thief as investigative tool or evidentiary device rather than as target).
36. Id. at 76-82.
37. 1d. at 74; Blakey 9- Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1563-65.
38. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1565.
39. Id. Several reasons have been advanced to explain this reluctance, including public
acceptance and lack of moral condemnation for the crime, the fence's integration into the
legitimate socioeconomic structure, his relationship with enforcement authorities, and the
difficulty of penetrating his operation in situations in which he has connections with
organized crime. Chappell & Walsh, supra note 34, at 487-92.
40. Walsh Interview, supra note 8.
41. One type of antifencing enforcement tactic that could have reached knowing
secondary purchasers was a project in which undercover officers peddled allegedly stolen
merchandise to business people in the community suspected of buying stolen goods from
thieves and fences. Although not designed specifically to detect secondary purchasers, this
strategy did not require information from thieves with whom the secondary purchaser
may not have contact. Boggs Interview, supra note 17.
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can be expected to be greater than the utility of using these same re-
sources as they are presently employed. In order to effectuate such a
shift, certain modifications in the substantive criminal law should be
made in some states and new enforcement strategies should be devel-
oped and implemented.
A. Criminal Secondary Purchasers: Motives and Deterrents
Although the criminal laws of every state proscribe the knowing
purchase of stolen goods,42 the market continues to absorb such mer-
chandise "just like a huge dry sponge.' 43 An understanding of this
market is essential to development of appropriate deterrents.
While all purchasers of stolen goods probably are attracted by low
prices, 44 secondary criminal purchasers may have identifiable behavioral
characteristics that differentiate them from primary fences. First, sec-
ondary criminal purchasers probably have smaller economic gains from
their purchases and, therefore, are likely to be less motivated to engage
in the illegal conduct than are primary receivers .4  Second, because
secondary purchasers deal with fences rather than with thieves, and
thus are somewhat removed from thefts, secondary purchasers are likely
42. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-119(3) (West Supp. 1979) (anyone who
knowingly, or with belief, receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property is guilty of
offense); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(d) (Smith-Hurd 1977) (offense committed by anyone
who knowingly, or with reason to believe, obtains control over stolen property).
43. S. REP. No. 1318, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974). The fact of illegality, absent enforce-
ment, has had little deterrent effect. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 4 (statement of Joseph
P. Busch, District Attorney, County of Los Angeles) ("Too many legitimate businessmen
are willing to buy hot merchandise, if it assures them of a higher profit."); id. at 161
(letter from Robert Earl Barnes) ("[I]t is easier to sell something that is stolen than it is to
sell a legitimate item."). Vincent "Swaggi," a professional fence interviewed by one com-
mentator, perhaps best described public response:
See, most people figure all of the stuff in my store is hot, which you know it ain't.
But if they figure it's hot you can't keep 'er away from it .... You think I'm gonna
tell 'em it ain't hot? Not on your life. In fact I tell 'em it is hot.
C. KLocKAas, supra note 22, at 79.
44. See C. KLocKmAs, supra note 22, at 62 ("Everybody's looking for a bargain .
If the price is right and a man can use the merchandise, he's gonna buy. No question
about it."); Roselius & Benton, supra note 12, at 190 (primary attraction is the lower-
than-wholesale price).
45. As in the legitimate marketplace, in the market for stolen goods the number of
distributors (primary fences) who deal directly with manufacturers (thieves) should be
considerably less than the number of retailers, wholesalers, and consumers on subsequent
distribution levels. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that most secondary criminal pur-
chasers engage in less criminal conduct, that is, deal in a smaller volume of stolen goods,
than do most primary receivers. This suggests that the economic gains of individual
secondary purchasers from their criminal conduct are probably smaller than those of
primary purchasers. Moreover, higher profits may be demanded at the primary level as




to feel less criminal than either primary fences or thieves.4" Further-
more, they may rationalize that others will buy the low-priced goods if
they do not.47 These factors make it easier for individual secondary
criminal purchasers to ignore the critical connection between their own
unlawful behavior and the high level of property theft in the com-
munity, and, thus, the negative consequences of their purchases on
prior and future theft victims.48
These factors suggest that secondary purchasers may be more easily
deterred than primary purchasers. It has been recognized that enforce-
ment threats are more likely to deter individuals who have weaker
motivations for their criminal conduct,49 who see themselves as less
criminal,o and who engage in apparently minor, rationally motivated
46. Although criminal secondary purchasers may know that their conduct is unlawful,
the lack of enforcement and the lack of public condemnation suggest that buying stolen
goods from a fence is more socially acceptable than buying from a thief. Thus, a receiver's
decision to deal with a fence rather than a thief may reflect a desire to appear less
criminal. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 44 (statement of Franklyn H. Snitow, Assistant
District Attorney, New York County, N.Y.) ("No god-fearing honest merchant will buy
'hot' goods directly from a thief, but a few do not mind buying from a well-mannered,
elegantly dressed fence .... )
47. A purchaser may argue that his private refusal to buy stolen goods would have an
inconsequential effect on the amount of theft. One writer maintains:
I do not believe that a rational economic argument can be made against an in-
dividual decision to buy stolen goods. The claim that theft costs everyone as reflected
in higher costs and insurance rates is inadequate. It costs everyone surely, but those
who buy stolen goods manage to offset these higher costs and rates. In fact, were it
simply a question of a personal economic strategy, one might argue that the only
way to beat the consequences of the thieves' market is to patronize it.
C. KLOCKARS, supra note 22, at 150.
48. The crime of receipt of stolen goods has a real victim, the victim of the theft, even
though his identity may be unknown to the receiver. This serves to differentiate the
purchase of stolen goods from other illegitimate buyer-supplier markets. In narcotics, for
example, the lack of enforcement against users as opposed to drug sellers may reflect
public recognition that the former primarily harm themselves. See 2 WORKING PAPERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws 1102 (1970) (distributors
pose greater threat, more directly involve other persons, and evoke less benevolent feelings
than users, and thus are more appropriate target for law enforcement) [hereinafter cited
as WORKING PAPERS].
Because the theft victim is distant and unknown, unlawful purchasers may believe the
bureaucratic system is the only victim. See Roselius & Benton, suPra note 12, at 190 (con-
sumers of stolen goods may be motivated by the prospect of "beating the system"). Indeed,
the community may consider the sale of stolen goods to be a "social service for the hard-
pressed consumer." Chappell & Walsh, supra note 34, at 491-92.
49. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 135-36 (1973).
50. See N. MORRIs, THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 13 (1951) (concluding that "the effective-
ness of deterrence varies in inverse proportion to the moral seriousness of the offense").
The fact that deterrence is more effective for minor offenses may be due "to the impact
of threats on persons for whom a deterrent threat is not necessary to prevent more
serious criminality." F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 49, at 134. Thus, persons who
feel less criminal probably are more responsive to enforcement threats that highlight their
criminality. Two examples may be found in shoplifting and prostitution enforcement.
Certain shoplifters, known as pilferers, like criminal secondary purchasers of stolen goods
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crimes.5 1 Although all criminal secondary purchasers may not have
these characteristics, some clearly do, and it is a fair generalization that
a gTeater proportion of secondary than primary receivers correspond to
this profile of the more easily deterred offender. Thus, allocation of a
portion of property theft enforcement dollars for deterrence of criminal
secondary purchasers could increase the marginal utility of those
dollars. Secondary purchasers should respond to an enforcement risk;
some should be completely deterred and others should at least be made
more cautious, their purchases less frequent. Furthermore, even mini-
mal enforcement, if coupled with widespread communication of the
new enforcement approach, could have a far-reaching effect.52
B. Economic Effects of Enforcement Against Criminal
Secondary Purchasers
Deterrence of criminal secondary purchasers could have a significant
impact on the economic conditions motivating property theft, and thus
on its incidence. The amount of theft is limited by the rate at which
stolen goods can be sold to the public.53 This economic motivation for
the crime suggests that enforcement against criminal participants in
the redistribution channel may decrease the amount of illegal activity
in more than one way. Not only can particular offenders be incapaci-
tated through arrest and removal from the community,5 4 but, in ad-
who buy occasionally or for personal consumption, may be respectable people not in con-
tact with a criminal subculture. One theory advanced to explain the low rate of
recidivism of shoplifters who are apprehended but set free is that the experience forced
them to view themselves as thieves. M. CAMERON, THE BOOSTER AND THE SNITCII 151-65
(1964). Similarly, in prostitution enforcement, resources are more effectively applied to
patrons of prostitutes than to the prostitutes themselves, despite the fact that a single
prostitute has many more contacts and is easier to detect. Jennings, The Victim as
Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution Law, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1235, 1281
(1976). Thus, by analogy, secondary purchasers, like patrons of prostitutes, may be more
threatened by the risk of enforcement than are more criminally engaged participants.
51. F. ZIMRING & G. HAwKINS, supra note 49, at 135-36.
52. See id. at 147 ("Formal and informal channels of communication-including news-
paper and television accounts of the new threat and stories of those punished for law-
breaking-will bring the message to members of the threatened audience.")
53. Chamberlain, Anti-Fence Legislation, 14 A.B.A.J. 517, 517 (1928); see P. COLQUHOUN,
A TREATISE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS 173 (3d ed. London 1796) ("Nothing . . .
can be more just than the old observation, 'that if there were no Receivers there would
be no thieves.'-Deprive a thief of a sale and ready market for his goods, and lie is un-
done.") (italics in original); J. HALL, supra note 5, at 161 (receiver is as dependent on
market for stolen goods as thief).
54. See Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in EssAYs
IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 68, 83 (G. Becker & W. Landes eds. 1974).
This factor may be less significant in the case of thieves than in the case of other
criminals in the redistribution channel, because it is likely that the amount of theft may
be dictated in large part by primary market demand for stolen goods. If so, when one
thief is removed from the redistribution channel, another may take his place.
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dition, the risks and costs to all offenders can be raised, thereby making
the conduct less profitable, and so, less attractive.5
Enforcement against thieves affects the rate of property theft directly:
it both removes thieves from the redistribution channel and raises the
risks associated with thefts so that a thief will require a higher rate of
return in order to continue his illegal activities. 5 Enforcement against
primary fences seeks to achieve similar effects indirectly. If the primary
fence is apprehended and removed it may increase the risks to thieves
in two ways: the fence may testify against his thieves, and his thieves
will have to find new fences or attempt to peddle the stolen goods
themselves. 57 In addition, enforcement against primary fences should
raise the risks and costs of operation to these receivers, cutting into
their profits so that they, too, will require a higher rate of return. This
need for higher profits has a spiraling deterrent effect. If primary fences
lower the prices paid to thieves or raise the prices charged to customers,
they decrease the economic incentives to those parties to engage in
their criminal acts. If thieves or customers decrease their criminal be-
havior, supply or demand respectively also should decrease, cutting
further into primary fences' profits, and, ultimately, reducing the oVer-
all rate of property theft.5s The deterrent effect on thieves resulting
from the combined enforcement techniques, therefore, arises from direct
risks of enforcement, indirect risks as a result of apprehension of the
primary fence, and, possibly, decreased prices and lessened demand for
stolen goods.
These anticipated effects have motivated enforcement against thieves
55. Research indicates that offenders engaged in crimes involving material gains are,
as a group, profit maximizers. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforce-
ment, 1 J. LEG. STun. 259, 274-75 (1972) (offenders as a group respond to costs and gains
in much the same way as those engaged in legitimate activities); Ehrlich, supra note 54,
at 111-12 (same).
56. It should be noted that the effectiveness of enforcement as a threat or cost depends
not only on the actual likelihood of arrest and conviction, but on the offender's percep-
tion of it. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 49, at 162.
57. See Taking the Offensive, sutra note 18, at 7 (arresting fence leaves thieves without
outlet for stolen goods and without directions on what to steal).
58. If the price charged to customers increases, the profitability of buying stolen
goods decreases so that at least knowing customers will buy less. See Roselius & Benton,
supra note 12, at 194 (as price increases, competitive position of legitimate dealers im-
proies). Because both thieves and fences probably make many of the same marketing
decisions that are made by legitimate businessmen, id. at 204, the anticipated marketing
response to a decrease in secondary receivers' demand would be a decrease in the primary
receiver's demand and, thus, in the supply of stolen goods, id. at 201. If primary fences
buy less from thieves, the theft rate should decline. Similarly, if decreased secondary
demand prompts primary fences to lower their prices to purchasers, and thus also to
lower prices paid to thieves for stolen goods, the incentive for theft, and so the incidence
of theft, again should decline. See Ehrlich, supra note 55, at 274-75 (contending that of-
fenders respond to costs and benefits).
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and primary fences. It has not been emphasized, however, that like
effects may be achieved from enforcement against the aware customers
of fences.
Enforcement against, and consequent deterrence of, such purchasers
should further reduce the economic incentives to the other criminal
participants in the redistribution channel and magnify the spiraling
deterrent effect described above. If secondary market demand for stolen
goods were reduced, the primary fence would be forced to compensate
for that reduction, just as he must compensate for his own enforcement
risks under current enforcement policy.50 Again, whether the primary
fence were to increase prices charged or to decrease prices paid, he
would reduce the incentive to secondary purchasers or thieves, respec-
tively. Other alternative responses would have similar effects. If the
fence were to attempt to mask the stolen goods before sale to make them
appear legitimate, this would create an additional cost of doing business,
for which the fence would similarly be forced to compensate, either
through decreased prices paid or increased prices charged.10 If he were
to restrict his sales to a few trusted customers, he still would face an
additional risk of detection from their testimony, if they were to be
apprehended as part of the new enforcement effort against secondary
purchasers. Again the fence would be compelled to compensate for that
increased risk. Moreover, in either case, the redistribution channel may
be lengthened, 1' further cutting into profits, elevating prices, and so
decreasing demand. 2
Thus, enforcement against criminal secondary purchasers could de-
crease the incidence of property theft by increasing the risks and costs
of other criminal participants in the redistribution channel. These
risks and costs serve as economic deterrents to the criminal conduct and
add to the deterrent effect provided by the physical risks of appre-
hension and conviction. Thus shifting some enforcement resources
59. If there is a decrease in customer demand, a fence must change his marketing
program, and these changes may also make him more vulnerable to enforcement efforts.
Roselius & Benton, sukra note 12, at 201.
60. The process of disguising stolen goods is costly for several reasons, not the least
of which is that the process usually requires one or more intermediaries who must be
compensated for their labor. See id. at 192.
61. See id. (when stolen goods are disguised, redistribution channel may be lengthened).
If the primary fence limits sales to a few trusted customers without decreasing his supply,
such customers are likely to be commercial receivers, because lay purchasers are only
seeking articles to consume and, therefore, probably buy in smaller quantities. Thus,
articles that might have been sold to lay purchasers would be sold instead to commercial
purchasers, thereby lengthening the redistribution channel.
62. Id. at 201 (as channel lengthens, prices to secondary purchasers would increase and
secondary demand and profitability for participants decrease).
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away from efforts at apprehension of thieves and primary fences-
where the marginal returns are often small-to criminal secondary pur-
chasers-thereby creating increased economic risks to all participants in
the redistribution channel-can result in more effective enforcement.
C. Enforcement Practices Against Criminal Secondary Purchasers of
Stolen Goods
Supplementing current property theft enforcement policy with a new
focus requires an appropriate statutory framework and the design of
practical enforcement tactics.
1. Elements of the Substantive Criminal Law
Several states have laws against criminal receipt of stolen goods that
are inadequate to sustain effective enforcement strategies against those
involved in the criminal redistribution network. Commentators previ-
ously have recognized these statutory inadequacies,6 3 but their discus-
sions have emphasized the need to enhance the ability of the criminal
justice system to reach primary fences. Nonetheless, these critiques
point up deficiencies in many current statutes as applied to enforce-
ment against criminal secondary purchasers of stolen goods as well.
Some of the criticisms have focused on the effect of certain provisions
on investigative practices. For example, some statutes require that the
purchased merchandise be "stolen" at the time of purchase.64 This
requirement has been interpreted by some courts to include only those
goods actually stolen and, as of the time of purchase, not recovered by
enforcement authorities.63 That interpretation renders the common
undercover "buy-sell" tactic impossible. Even if a thief were inter-
cepted on his way to his fence, under this view the stolen articles would
be considered recovered, and thus even the willing thief could not assist
enforcement authorities by completing the sale.
Prosecutorial difficulties arising from various statutory requirements
63. See, e.g., J. HALL, suPra note 5, at 173-232 (describing inadequacies in New York
receiver statutes); Blakey 8: Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1542-1611 (detailing statutory in-
adequacies and suggesting reforms).
64. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.40
(McKinney 1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Monasterski, 567 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1977) (reversing con-
viction for knowing receipt of stolen property because goods lost their stolen character
when recovered by security employees); People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906)
(knowing receipt of stolen property impossible because goods recovered by owner no
longer technically stolen).
In addition, this requirement has forced authorities to link a stolen object received by
a fence with a particular theft in order to prove its origin. This is a major obstacle be-
cause marks of identification usually have been removed or altered by the time stolen
goods pass through redistribution channels. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1551-58.
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also have been stressed. Among these difficulties is the requirement in
some jurisdictions that the prosecution prove that the accused actually
"received" rather than obtained control of or sold the goods.00 In addi-
tion, the prosecution may have difficulty obtaining appropriate sen-
tences for convicted offenders in states where the offense is gTaded as
either felony or misdemeanor according to the value of the merchandise
purchased, rather than to the degree of the offender's criminal involve-
ment. 67
Statutory requirements such as these that hinder enforcement against
primary fences would generate enforcement problems on the secondary
level as well. Like the transaction between a thief and his fence, the
crime committed by a secondary purchaser is "invisible": not only are
sales generally accomplished in private, but even in those instances in
which the goods are transferred openly, there is nothing inherently
unlawful or suspicious about the merchandise.0 8 This suggests that sec-
ondary purchasers,'like those on the primary level, can only be de-
tected through undercover enforcement strategies.
Such strategies work best when at least three statutory conditions
are satisfied. First, the receiver statute, either alone or in combination
with a general attempt provision, should impose sanctions against the
willing purchaser of goods believed to be stolen, 9 whether they actually
are stolen or not. This facilitates the use of "bait" property to make
arrests. Second, the statutes should proscribe the sale of stolen property
66. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-71 (Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-2 (1970).
When receipt must be proved, the purchaser may counter successful prosecution by avoid-
ing physical contact with the stolen goods. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1545-46 &
n.195. Statutory provisions proscribing the disposal of stolen goods as well as their
receipt would make prosecution less problematic since police may only haie eiidence of
a knowledgeable sale. See id. at 1546 (term "disposal" or "sale" could facilitate plosecution
of modern receivers).
67. Criminal statutes that grade receiver offenses according to the value of the prop-
erty received are still common. See THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO DrALING IN STOLEN GOODS 15 (1975). This type of grading
structure for criminal receipt of stolen goods is considered inadequate primarily because
judicial leniency may be required even when the receiver is clearly a notorious offender.
See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 219 (person who deals regularly in stolen goods inflicts
"graver harm" on society, and legislation that imposes uniform sanctions for all receivers
is unjust); Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1599 (reasons for inadequacy include
difficulty in determining value, lack of accuracy, and obscuring of blameworthiness dis-
tinctions). To ensure that persistent felons receive heavier sentences, several states have
passed habitual criminal statutes. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-101 (1978); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
68. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1516. This serves to distinguish the sale of
stolen property from the sale of narcotics, where the merchandise quickly can be con-
firmed as illegal.
69. Id. at 1552-55; see, e.g., People v. Rojas, 55 Cal. 2d 252, 257-58, 358 P.2d 921, 923-24,
10 Cal. Rptr. 465, 467-68 (1961); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.51(A) (Page 1975); cf. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 223.6 (P.O.D. 1962) (concluding that belief merchandise probably was stolen
is sufficient for conviction of any purchaser).
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as well as the "receipt" of such property.70 This would permit authori-
ties to prove offenses against primary purchasers through the testimony
of customers about their suppliers.7 ' Finally, the punishment for a
single unlawful purchase should not be needlessly harsh, because ex-
treme penalties may result in nonenforcement and much of the de-
terrent effect stems from the social stigma of involvement with criminal
activity rather than from the threat of incarceration.7 2 Although these
conditions are satisfied by the statutes of many jurisdictions, where the
problems still exist such obstacles to effective enforcement should be
removed.
2. Possible Enforcement Strategies
Effective enforcement efforts often require deception, especially in
crimes without complainants, 73 because such crimes might otherwise
be impossible to detect. Receipt of stolen goods is such a crime, and
undercover strategies are necessary to identify and apprehend criminal
secondary purchasers. 4
70. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(1) (West Supp. 1979); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2913.51(A) (Page 1975).
71. The sentence of a criminal secondary purchaser, of course, may be negotiated. In
many cases, an offer of immunity to assist in apprehending a primary fence may be
justified. Indeed, this may reduce some of the social costs associated with enforcement
against primary fences. Although current strategies utilize information from thieves to
learn about specific primary fences, even if it means offering grants of immunity or other
sacrifices in order to elicit cooperation, in some cases the same information may be
obtained from criminal secondary purchasers who are less criminally active and, arguably,
less dangerous sources.
72. The deterrent effect of enforcement is achieved through a combination of forces-
community recognition of the harm, destruction of the self-image of legitimacy, the
greater risk of apprehension and conviction, and the sentence exacted. See F. ZIMRING &
G. HAWKINS, supra note 49, at 81-83. Of these, the possibility of incarceration may be the
least significant deterrent. See J. CONKLIN, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 131 (1975) (formal
criminal sanctions are probably less important in controlling behavior than informal
sanctions such as group censure and bystander intervention).
73. See 1 VORKING PAPERS, suPra note 48, at 308.
74. Tactical designs must be bounded by the doctrine of entrapment. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975) (affirmative defense satisfied if public official actively
induces or encourages another person to engage in offense and creates substantial risk
that person was not otherwise disposed to commit offense). An enforcement ploy must
not lure an otherwise innocent person into a criminal act or "implant in [his] mind ...
the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission." Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). The artifice is acceptable, however, if agents
"merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense." Id. at 441.
The majority view espoused in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) and
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976) focuses on the "origin of intent"
test, whereby the accused's predisposition to engage in the crime is examined. The
minority view, or the "police conduct" test, focuses on whether the police conduct was a
proper use of government power. P. LEWIS & K. PEOPLES, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS 484 (1978).
Issues similar to those that would be raised by undercover enforcement ploys directed
at criminal secondary purchasers have been raised by enforcement campaigns against
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Currently, undercover property theft enforcement strategies fall into
two modes. In the first, the target is the unknown offender. For
example, officers may pose as fences at the primary level to apprehend
thieves and, occasionally, competing primary fences75 This method
does not actively search for offenders, but rather attracts them,76 and
has been praised for obtaining large numbers of arrests and convictions
at relatively low overall cost.7
7
In the second mode, the target of the undercover strategy is a specific
offender. Thus, for example, after a primary fence has been identified
by several thieves, undercover officers may pose as thieves or customers
in order to investigate and make an arrest.78 Such procedures are the
only feasible methods for apprehending most primary-leVel fences who
maintain regular establishments where other criminals come to engage
in transactions. In order to employ the first strategic mode against
primary fences, undercover officers would have to pose as thieves or
customers and actively search for offenders on a "hit-or-miss" basis;
such a search could be construed as harassment by legitimate members
of the community.
Both modes of undercover enforcement are workable against criminal
secondary purchasers. When the first mode is employed, such tactics
may be ancillary to any others already in effect. The role played by the
officer will be the same role now played to apprehend thieves in
"sting"-type operations-that of the primary fence. If an undercover
operation were to foster a reputation for willingly selling certain types
of stolen goods in addition to buying them, secondary purchasers might
contact these enterprises. Officers could engineer a sale that could be
preserved on videotape, just as purchases from thieves are at present;
arrests of buyers as well as sellers could be made at the end of the
patrons of prostitutes. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1977, at 17, col. 5 (initial drive against
patrons of prostitutes discontinued in part because of protests of entrapment). A current
operation against prostitutes' patrons is considered free of entrapment problems because
the undercover policewomen dress sedately and do not approach or initiate conversations
with men. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1978, at 8, col. 1. The analogy to secondary receivers
suggests that undercover agents must represent the merchandise as stolen and should
refrain from active solicitation. Moreover, the price should be the same as or higher than
the going rate in the stolen goods market. Cf. Warner, The Troubling Ethics of Abscam,
TIME, Feb. 18, 1980, at 21 (suggesting there may be entrapment problems in recent FBI
"sting" because of hard-sell tactics by over-anxious contacts).
75. See p. 1230 suPra.
76. This method recently was employed by FBI undercover agents against members
of the United States Congress to enforce federal antibribery statutes. The probe and
premature disclosure generated widespread controversy. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1980,
at Al, col. 1.
77. See Taking the Offensive, supra note 18, at 16-19.
78. For a full discussion of buy-sell undercover specialized antifencing strategies that
are used to deal with local fencing problems, see STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 76-82.
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project, and the videotape evidence would aid in the conviction of both.
Obviously, tactical strategies within this first mode will vary in dif-
ferent communities depending on the local practices.79 Where most
secondary criminal purchases are made from "neighborhood" fences80
selling illicit merchandise in apartments and taverns, undercover of-
ficers may be placed in those parts of town in which these enterprises
flourish, attempting to establish themselves as local connections for
stolen goods. If successful, such ploys eventually should result in the
attraction and apprehension of both thieves and secondary purchasers.
The second mode of enforcement may be appropriate when a specific
segment of the community or a specific individual is suspected of
regular secondary criminal purchases. In such cases, officers posing as
fences may peddle stolen articles to suspects. This tactic was success-
fully employed against certain business people in Portland, Oregon .8
There, a policewoman posing as a fence claimed that her boyfriend, a
drug addict, had stolen the television sets she was selling. Of ap-
proximately twenty people solicited, there was only one refusal. After
agreeing to buy, the offenders were arrested and prosecuted. -82
Conclusion
The criminal secondary purchaser of stolen goods contributes sig-
nificantly to profit-motivated property theft. Rather than neglect him
because he engages in less criminal activity, criminal justice should
shift a portion of current property theft enforcement resources from
the primary fence and thief to this offender. With an appropriate
statutory framework and workable enforcement strategies, such a pro-
gram should reduce crimes against property by reducing the economic
benefits derived from them.
79. id.
80. See Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1529-31; Hearings, supra note 8, at 44
(statement of Franklyn H. Snitow, Assistant District Attorney, New York County, N.Y.)
(neighborhood fence found in every neighborhood deals directly with thief and openly
sells to buyers).
81. Boggs Interview, supra note 17.
82. The experiment was conducted by the antifencing detail, headed by Sergeant Harry
Boggs, in Portland, Oregon. Some of the various retailers solicited bought for personal
consumption and some for resale. Chasan, supra note 16, at 17. To one commentator, the
experiment implied that "big-time fences are wasting a lot of time and money trying to
look legitimate, because the public just doesn't care." Id.
Because the goods were not actually stolen, the offenders were charged with attempted
receipt of stolen property. Those convicted received light sentences-small fines and public
service work. An unexpected benefit from the program was a positive response to this
enforcement campaign from the underprivileged portion of the community who blamed
the willing buyers of stolen goods for repeated burglary victimizations. Boggs Interview,
supra note 17.
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